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A distinctive feature of the procedures re-
cently adopted by inflation-targeting central
banks is their forward-looking character. Fore-
casts of the economy’s future evolution condi-
tional upon alternative policies play a central
role in the banks’ deliberations, to an extent that
the procedures adopted are sometimes charac-
terized as “forecast targeting.” This emphasis
upon the future consequences of policy is un-
surprising in an approach that tries to maintain
as transparent as possible a relation between the
banks’ decisions and the ultimate goals of mon-
etary policy; after all, current decisions can still
affect the future, but not the past.
Nonetheless, common descriptions of how
inflation targeting is or should be practiced go
too far, in proposing purely forward-looking
procedures. I shall argue instead that an optimal
framework for the conduct of monetary policy
must generally be history-dependent in ways
precluded by these simple proposals. This fol-
lows from a general feature of the optimal con-
trol of a forward-looking system, which is to
say, one in which the private sector’s expecta-
tions about future policy are an important de-
terminant of the effects of monetary policy.
I. Purely Forward-Looking Procedures
By a purely forward-looking decision proce-
dure for monetary policy I mean one in which
the bank’s action at any time is conditioned
solely upon those aspects of the state of the
world that are relevant for forecasting the sub-
sequent evolution of the bank’s target variables,
which I shall here suppose to be the inflation
rate and the level of aggregate economic activ-
ity. Examples of such proposals are common-
place in the literature on inflation targeting. For
example, Mervyn King (1997) describes infla-
tion targeting as a regime of discretionary
policy-making, in which the central bank is
charged with minimization of a loss function
that differs from the true social objective, in
order to eliminate the Kydland-Prescott infla-
tion bias resulting from discretion. King’s mod-
ified loss function changes only the (constant)
target values for the target variables, and not the
variables themselves that the bank seeks to sta-
bilize; hence, a Markov equilibrium resulting
from discretionary optimization implies a pol-
icy that depends only upon states relevant to the
determination of current or future inflation and
output.
Common descriptions of “inflation-forecast tar-
geting” (e.g., Lars E. O. Svensson, 1999) illustrate
this feature even more clearly. Under such proce-
dures, an economic model is used to generate
conditional forecast paths for the target variables
from the present onward associated with alterna-
tive feasible policies. The bank then chooses
among the candidate forecast paths, either evalu-
ating them according to a loss function or select-
ing the path that satisfies some targeting criterion,
such as a requirement that the forecast of inflation
at some future horizon equals a target value,
which may depend upon the output forecast. The
bank’s current action is then the one required by
the chosen scenario. The procedure is repeated
afresh in each decision cycle. Past states obviously
cannot affect the action that is chosen, if they
affect neither the set of scenarios judged to be
possible nor the criterion used to choose among
alternative scenarios.
Other authors have described inflation-
targeting policies as rules for setting a short-
term interest rate as a function of forecasts of
the future paths of the target variables (raising
interest rates in proportion to the forecasted
excess of inflation over the target level). Some-
times the forecast is assumed to correspond to a
scenario in which the interest rate is left at
its current level; in other cases it represents
a forecast of what should happen if the pre-
scribed policy rule is followed. In either case,
if the prescribed interest rate is a function only
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of the forecasts, such a decision procedure is
purely forward-looking.
II. Why Optimal Policy Must
Be History-Dependent
It might seem that the property just identified
is a simple consequence of optimization, and
thus wholly desirable. In particular, one might
suppose that, in the case of a social objective
that is additively separable over time, familiar
principles of dynamic programming imply that
optimal policy at any point in time should de-
pend only upon state variables that determine
constraints upon possible paths of the target
variables from that time onward. However, such
principles apply only to the control of a system
in which the target variables evolve according
to laws of motion that are purely backward-
looking. When, instead, private-sector expecta-
tions of the economy’s future path are among
the determinants of the current values of target
variables (as in almost any model of the mon-
etary transmission mechanism derived from op-
timizing behavior), such a conclusion is
incorrect (Woodford, 1999a).
The reason is simple. In general, forward-
looking behavior implies that more desirable
responses of the target variables (inflation and
output) to a shock can be achieved if it can be
arranged for private-sector expectations about
the future paths of the target variables to adjust
in the right way in response to the shock. How-
ever, this can occur (when the private sector has
rational expectations) only if subsequent
central-bank policy does in fact change as a
result of the past shocks in such a way as to
bring about the alternative evolution that it was
desired that people would expect. However, an-
ticipation by the private sector that the central
bank will apply a purely forward-looking pro-
cedure at later dates precludes such adjustment
of expectations at the earlier date.
The history-dependence of optimal policy can
be usefully illustrated in the context of a simple
optimizing model of the monetary transmission
mechanism, analyzed by Richard Clarida et al.
(1999) and by Woodford (1999a), among others.
In this model, inflation pt and the output gap xt
(output relative to its efficient level) are deter-
mined by a pair of structural relations, consisting
of an aggregate supply curve and an intertemporal
Euler equation. The first relation determines pt
given xt, inflation expectations (Etpt11), and an
exogenous cost shock ut. The second determines
xt given Etxt11, the expected real rate of return
(determined by the central bank’s instrument it
and by Etpt11), and exogenous variation in the
Wicksellian “natural rate of interest” rtn. I assume
that social welfare requires the minimization of
the expected value of a discounted sum of period
losses of the form
(1) Lt 5 p t2 1 lx xt2 1 l i i t2
for some weights lx . 0, li $ 0.
In this simple model, conditional forecasts in
period t of the paths of the target variables from
that period onward depend only upon the exog-
enous state vector st, describing information at
t about the current and future values of the
exogenous disturbances ut1j , rt1jn . Thus any
determinate equilibrium resulting from a purely
forward-looking procedure makes it, pt, and xt
functions solely of st. If the disturbances are
Markovian, this means a function only of the
current disturbances ut and rtn.
Except in the special case that li 5 0 and
there are no cost shocks, an optimal equilibrium
requires these variables to be functions of
lagged disturbances as well. For example, in the
case of a transitory cost shock, a forward-
looking procedure results in an equally transi-
tory increase in inflation and decrease in output,
with both variables expected to return to their
average values once the disturbance is past.
However, an optimal commitment would in-
volve a negative output gap that returns to zero
only slowly, so that the initial burst of inflation
is expected to be followed by a period of dis-
inflation; when li 5 0, this eventually returns
the price level to its original trend path (Clarida
et al. 1999; Woodford, 1999b). This expectation
of subsequent disinflation mitigates the effects
of the adverse cost shock, by restraining price
increases during the period of the shock.
Similarly, in the case of a transitory increase
in the natural rate of interest, a forward-looking
procedure results in an equally transitory
increase in the nominal interest rate. When
li . 0, an optimal commitment instead in-
volves a more persistent increase in the nominal
interest rate (Woodford, 1999a). This results in
a larger response of long rates (which restrain
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expenditure and hence prices despite the distur-
bance), without requiring a sharp increase in
short rates. As a result, it is possible to simul-
taneously achieve lower volatility of inflation,
the output gap, and the short-term nominal in-
terest rate.
Purely forward-looking procedures forfeit
these gains from desirable responses of inflation
expectations and interest-rate expectations to
exogenous shocks. In addition, purely forward-
looking approaches more easily result in inde-
terminacy of equilibrium. In the model sketched
above, an exogenously specified nominal inter-
est-rate process results in price-level indetermi-
nacy; a determinate equilibrium requires a
sufficient degree of dependence (of the right
sort) of the central bank’s interest-rate operating
target upon endogenous variables, such as in-
flation and output (Woodford, 1999a). Further-
more, an operational procedure must make the
interest rate a function of variables that are
exogenous or predetermined at the time that the
interest rate is chosen (Svensson and Woodford,
1999). In the case of a purely forward-looking
procedure, this means a function solely of the
exogenous state st, as no predetermined endog-
enous variables are relevant for forecasting the
target variables. But such a procedure necessar-
ily leads to indeterminacy of the paths of both
inflation and output.
III. Examples of History-Dependent Policy
There are a variety of ways in which a deci-
sion procedure for monetary policy might in-
corporate the sort of history-dependence
required for an optimal regime. As Svensson
and Woodford (1999) stress, these include
history-dependent variants of inflation-forecast
targeting procedures. For example, a forecast-
targeting procedure that amounts to discretion-
ary optimization can nonetheless be sufficiently
history-dependent, if the loss function that the
central bank seeks to minimize is modified in a
way that introduces history-dependence.
A particularly straightforward approach is to
incorporate into the bank’s loss function terms
that represent the value, at earlier dates, of hav-
ing people anticipate different subsequent paths
of the target variables (Svensson and Woodford,
1999). For example, in the simple model above,
one might instead direct the central bank in
period t to seek to minimize an objective that
adds terms of the form f1,t21pt 1 f2,t21xt to
the expected discounted sum of terms Lt1j for
j $ 0. Here the coefficients fi,t21 are deter-
mined as part of the bank’s period-t21 decision
cycle and then taken as given parameters of the
bank’s objective in its period-t decision cycle.
A discretionary procedure of this kind has a
Markov equilibrium in which inflation and out-
put evolve as under the optimal commitment,
and the coefficients fi,t21 are set equal to La-
grange multipliers associated with that optimi-
zation problem.
This approach represents a relatively general
solution to the problem of making optimal pol-
icy consistent with a discretionary optimization
procedure. However, the practicality of the pro-
posal may be doubted. Since the coefficients
fi,t21 result from the central bank’s calcula-
tions when choosing period-t21 policy, they
respond to no endogenous variables (not chosen
by the bank itself) determined in period t21
and so will be a function solely of the history of
exogenous disturbances. Such a procedure once
again implies an interest-rate reaction function
that leads to indeterminacy (Svensson and
Woodford, 1999).
On both grounds one might therefore prefer
an alternative approach, in which the modified
loss function involves no time-varying coeffi-
cients, but instead a period loss function that
depends upon lagged as well as current values
of the target variables. In this case, discretionary
policy is history-dependent because the bank’s
loss function is history-dependent (even though
the true social loss function is not). The implied
reaction function will make the nominal interest
rate a function of lagged endogenous vari-
ables—dependence of which sort is necessary,
though not sufficient, for determinacy of
equilibrium.
For example, David Vestin (1999) shows that
discretionary optimization results in more nearly
optimal responses to cost shocks (in the above
model, with li 5 0) if the central bank is charged
with stabilization of the price level rather than the
inflation rate, even though the true social loss
function is that shown in equation (1). The pro-
posed loss function is history-dependent, in that it
effectively depends upon the cumulative sum of
inflation rates over all past periods, rather than
only upon the current period’s inflation rate. This
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is desirable, as it implies that an inflationary shock
should cause anticipation of lower inflation in
subsequent periods, to an extent that the price
level is expected to eventually return to its original
level.
Similarly, Henrik Jensen (1999) shows that a
nominal GDP growth target can be preferable to
discretionary minimization of the true social
loss function (“inflation targeting”) in a similar
model. This makes the period loss function de-
pend upon lagged output as well as the current
values of target variables. Specifically, low out-
put in the previous period leads the central bank
to choose low output and/or deflation in the
current period. As a result, a transitory cost
shock results in a more persistent contraction of
output, lowering overall inflation and output
variability as discussed above.
Finally, Woodford (1999a) shows that more
nearly optimal equilibrium responses to fluctu-
ations in the natural rate of interest (in the
model with li . 0) result from discretionary
optimization if the central bank’s period loss
function is given by
(2) Ltcb 5 p t2 1 lx xt2 1 lD ~it 2 it21 !2
for an appropriate choice of lD . 0, rather than
by the true social loss function (1). Such an
“interest-rate smoothing” objective induces the
sort of gradual adjustment of the interest rate
that characterizes responses under the optimal
commitment.
The appeal of such modified central-bank
objectives depends, of course, upon the expec-
tation that a discretionary optimizer will not
efficiently achieve its official aims. An appeal-
ing alternative involves commitment to the
achievement of a specific targeting criterion.
Introducing history-dependence is especially
straightforward under such an approach; one
simply needs a targeting criterion that depends
upon past values of the target variables, as well
as their current and future values.
For example, in the case that li 5 0, Wood-
ford (1999a) shows that a policy that ensures
that inflation satisfies the targeting criterion
(3) p t 1 ~lx /k!@xt 2 xt21 # 5 0
(where k is the slope of the short-run Phillips
curve) suffices to ensure that the equilibrium
responses to cost shocks are optimal. The tar-
geting criterion is history-dependent in that (3)
involves xt21. Note that if the efficient level of
output is a deterministic trend, and l 5 k, this
rule corresponds to nominal GDP-growth tar-
geting, as proposed by Jensen; however, the
latter rule is fully optimal only in this special
case.
In the more general case that li . 0, Marc P.
Giannoni (1999) shows that the optimal target-
ing criterion instead takes the form
(4) it 5 r1 it21 1 r2 ~it21 2 it22 !
1 cpp t 1 cx ~xt 2 xt21 !
for appropriately chosen coefficients r1 , r2 , cp,
cx . 0. The optimal values of these coeffi-
cients depend upon the coefficients of the struc-
tural equations and of the loss function (4), but
they are completely independent of all parame-
ters specifying the shock processes. Again this
condition determines a unique nonexplosive
equilibrium corresponding to the optimal
commitment.
The targeting criterion (4) provides a rule for
setting the central bank’s interest-rate instru-
ment that is in the spirit of the “Taylor rule.”
But it differs from John B. Taylor’s (1993)
classic formulation in involving additional
history-dependence: interest rates respond to
the growth rate of the output gap rather than to
its level, and the coefficients r1 , r2 . 0 imply
inertial interest-rate dynamics. It is interesting
to note that both of these departures from Tay-
lor’s formulation characterize at least some
econometric estimates of actual Fed reaction
functions (e.g., John P. Judd and Glenn D.
Rudebusch, 1998).
This example indicates that an optimal tar-
geting criterion need not involve forecasts for
periods beyond the one for which interest
rates are being set. In this case, private-sector
anticipation of subsequent central-bank action
substitutes for preemptive actions by the cen-
tral bank. However, the optimality of this rule
under an arbitrary information structure de-
pends upon the absence of intrinsic dynamics
in the model’s structural equations; more gen-
erally, an optimal targeting criterion will
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involve forecasts, as in Svensson (1999).
Even so, an optimal procedure will not gen-
erally be purely forward-looking, but will
instead have to involve backward-looking
elements of the kind illustrated here.
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